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Donaldson faces these challenges in a calm, care-
ful, and charitable manner. He rightly discerns that the 
key issue is hermeneutical—exactly how is the Bible to 
be interpreted? He addresses this question in his initial 
chapter (1-30), which explores the false and inconsis-
tent literalism on which so much dispensationalism is 
based. Only when the first order interpretative ques-
tions are addressed is it then possible to proceed to an-
swer the question “Who is Israel?” (31-69). He effec-
tively exposes the dispensational dual-track “Israel on 
Earth, Christians in Heaven” approach. This approach 
clears the ground for a much-needed clarification of 
the nature of “the kingdom of God,” which rejects 
the restoration of some sort of territorially delimited 
Davidic realm (70-95).
Thereafter, Donaldson proceeds to correct dis-
pensationalist misreading of passages such as Daniel 
9:24-7, Matthew 24, I Thessalonians 4:13-18, II 
Thessalonians 2:1-10, and Revelation 20:1-10 (96-
147). The discussion of these passages offered by 
Donaldson is rich with insight and worthy of careful 
study, especially by those who have allowed the dis-
pensational system and outlook to become part of 
their mental furniture. Donaldson clearly draws from 
writers familiar to many readers of Pro Rege, such as 
William Hendriksen (1900-82), Herman Ridderbos 
(1909-2007), and David Holwerda, late of Calvin 
Seminary. Also, and especially in his conclusions (150-
160), Donaldson’s thinking has been influenced by 
N.T. Wright, currently Research Professor of New 
Testament and Early Christianity, at St. Mary’s College 
in the University of Saint Andrews, Scotland. He ex-
hibits a deep accord with Wright’s contextual readings 
of Scripture and integral approach to eschatology (55-
7, 68, 80-1, 154, 159). Donaldson acknowledges that 
he has drawn on the work of J. Richard Middleton, 
Professor of Biblical Worldview and Exegesis at 
Northeastern Seminary, Rochester, NY, as did N.T. 
Wright (152-4, 159).
Those seeking a lucid and accessible introduction 
to the many problems inherent to premillennial dis-
pensationalism should make Donaldson’s book their 
first choice. It is strongly recommended. Of course, 
there is more to be said—as is always the case. A passing 
reference is made to the fact that what has passed for a 
Christian worldview “has been influenced by Platonic 
dualism and by ideas reminiscent of Gnosticism” 
(154). Arguably, this observation, if followed through, 
would serve to recast our understanding of the entire 
history of post-Apostolic Christianity and, not least, 
provide considerable insight into the philosophical 
roots and historical origins of more than dispensation-
alism itself. Certainly, an appreciation of the teachings 
and influence of premillennial dispensationalism helps 
to explain why so many avowedly “Bible-believing” 
evangelical Christians remain tragically impervious to 
more biblically grounded and directed calls for integral 
Christian thinking and living.
Smith, James K. A. Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works. Volume 2 of Cultural Liturgies. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013. 198 pages. ISBN 978-0-8010-3578-4. Reviewed by Laurence C. Sibley, 
Jr., visiting professor at Baltic Reformed Theological Seminary, Riga, Latvia. 
Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works begins 
in a Costco food court as author James K.A. Smith 
reads Wendell Berry’s Bringing it to the Table, an an-
thology of essays critiquing the dominant systems of 
food production and consumption. While reading, 
Smith realizes that there is a gap between his world-
view and his actions; he ponders that “‘the food court 
at Costco’ might be a kind of shorthand for Berry’s pic-
ture of the sixth circle of hell”(Imagining 8). Asserting 
that Imagining the Kingdom “is something of a hybrid, 
pitched between the academy and the church, since 
its argument is aimed at both” (Imagining xvii), Smith 
uncovers the roots of a Costco lifestyle and contrasts 
those roots with those of the kingdom of God. In oth-
er words, he presents two visions of the good life that 
are each struggling for dominance.
Imagining the Kingdom is the second volume of a 
3-volume series on the theology of culture that Smith 
calls the Cultural Liturgies Project. In a superb man-
ner, Smith packs a lot into a book that is less than 200 
pages. Seeking the renewal of liturgical and cultural 
practice leads Smith to write for educators, pastors, 
and worship leaders who are reflective and open to 
new ways of envisioning liturgical practice. He invites 
scholars to explore phenomenology and philosophy of 
religion, offering some original, constructive proposals 
for a research agenda. Throughout the book he uses 
sidebars from fiction, art, and life stories, as well as 
philosophical, cultural, and liturgical passages.
Professor of philosophy at Calvin College, where 
he holds the Gary & Henrietta Byker Chair in Applied 
Reformed Theology & Worldview, Smith is also the 
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editor of The Church and Postmodern Culture series 
(Baker Academic: http://www.churchandpomo.org). 
In Volume 1 of his Cultural Liturgies Project, Desiring 
the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural 
Formation (Baker Academic, 2009), Smith proposed 
 a theology of culture that understands human be-
ings as embodied actors rather than merely thinking 
things; prioritizes practices rather than ideas as the 
site of challenge and resistance; looks at cultural 
practices through the lens of worship or liturgy. 
(Desiring 35)
According to Smith, humans show their intention 
through their loves and desires. This intention is shaped 
by “bodily practices, routines, or rituals” (Desiring 63) 
that capture our hearts and form an imaginary view 
of the world. In a return to Augustine and pre-mo-
dernity, Smith asserts that the human person is homo 
liturgicus—not homo rationalis, as in Descartes and 
modernity (Desiring 40). 
Kinaesthetics and Poetics
The Augustinian view of humanity as homo liturgicus 
resurfaces in Imagining the Kingdom, as Smith digs 
deeper into a theory of practice. Smith draws on the 
work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) on 
kinaesthetics—how the body knows or perceives—
and Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) on poetics—how 
the body hears stories—to build a theoretical toolbox 
for naming and articulating a Christian liturgical an-
thropology (Imagining 29, 101). Smith believes that 
kinaesthetics and poetics are at the heart of liturgi-
cal anthropology. His working axiom is “rooted in a 
theological claim about the sorts of creatures we are: 
created in the image of God, and called to image the 
Son who is the image of the invisible God, we, too, 
are incarnate in a sense. We are sacramental animals” 
(Imagining 101).
Smith devotes much of chapters 1 and 2 to ex-
pounding the insights of Merleau-Ponty (kinaesthet-
ics) and Bourdieu (poetics) so that we can “appreciate 
the dynamics of habituation that make us the sorts of 
actors we are” (Imagining 33). In so doing, he pushes 
back against an intellectualist account of actions that 
assumes that as we think, we do. Rather, he asserts that 
as we do (habits), we think (theology, worldview, theo-
retical ethics); for Smith believes that “our incarnating, 
accommodating God meets us in and through the crea-
turely conditions” (Imagining 33).
To develop his idea, Smith writes, “Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perceptions1 (PP hereafter) is 
a classic account of how the body ‘knows’” (Imagining 
41). This “knowing” involves a hybridity, or an in-
carnational mind and body experience, which is nei-
ther intellectualist nor mere biological response. We 
develop a habitual way of being-in-the-world that is 
carried in our bodies but is known on a level that pre-
cedes and eludes conscious reflection/thinking, below 
the radar of the mind: “The body carries a kind of 
acquired, habituated knowledge or know-how that is 
irreducible yet fundamentally orienting for our being-
in-the-world” (Imagining 45). According to this view, 
our bodies are not just instruments of perception but 
are who we are: incarnated persons. Similarly, the body 
is the “me” that dwells in the world, my constant back-
ground. Smith asks, “What if the Christian life. . .is in-
scribed in our ‘habit-body’. . .[,] a sort of ‘momentum 
which throws us into our tasks, our cares, our situa-
tion, our familiar horizons?’” (PP 94; Smith 45)
In other words, experience is constituted against 
an acquired background that primes us to config-
ure impressions into a world. For instance, we move 
through familiar places without thinking/antepred-
icatively (PP 149—prior to and without predication) 
because our bodies have learned and inhabit this space. 
Smith asks, “what if inhabiting the world as God’s cre-
ation requires a similar ‘antepredicative’ knowledge of 
place?” (Imagining 53) Just knowing/intellecting the 
doctrine of creation is insufficient; inhabitation of the 
world as creation requires rehabituation “in the em-
bodied practices of Christian worship” (Imagining 53). 
He asks, “How do we teach the body[?]. . . .How is 
the body trained to perceive the world?” (Imagining 73)
Smith’s answer, drawn from Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus—a system of dispositions (lasting, acquired 
schemes of perception, thought, and action), an em-
bodied know-how that is carried in a community of 
practice—is that the body is trained in social liturgi-
cal situations, either Christian or secular.2 Habitus is 
a kind of embodied tradition, a handed-down way 
of being. Complex, ethically charged behavioral pat-
terns that were once learned in community function 
like “a motor running under the hood” (Imagining 
82) while we shop or run errands. It is this autonomic 
habitus that is often missed by intellectualist models 
of behavior that assert that we primarily act accord-
ing to conscious principles. When the liturgy of the 
mall leads to a habitus of consumerism, principles of 
simple living often lose the battle: Costco in spite of 
Wendell Berry. Does all this mean that the mind has 
no significant role to play? Early in the Imagining the 
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Kingdom, Smith situates the intellect, the life of the 
mind, and worldviews as important, but he also views 
them as secondary to the imagination as the source of 
action. The imagination needs the critique and guid-
ance of the mind. However, knowing what to love is 
not purely propositional knowledge; it is an aesthetic 
know-how that is derived from stories, pictures, im-
ages, and metaphors (Imagining 10–16, and later 
113–114, 125–126). Therefore, it is a “hybridity” or 
an incarnational mind and body experience, neither 
intellectualist nor mere biological response.
Escaping the food court at Costco
Having explained the basis of liturgical and cultural 
practice as a “hybridity,” Smith turns, in chapters 3 
and 4, to exploring how worship works, using the 
Ponty-Bourdieu toolbox. He focuses on the centrality 
of the imagination and the importance of the arts in 
sanctifying perceptions, especially the art of the story: 
“We’re less convinced by arguments than moved by 
stories” (Imagining 108). In words and signs, Christian 
worship enacts and performs the story of God’s re-
deeming work and his kingdom, drawing us into his 
action. This story is understood by the imagination.
Alternately, the stories of secular liturgies—of, say, 
the mall or of an electronic device—imagine another 
kingdom, one that is centered on the self rather than 
on God. For instance, Smith explains that the iPhone 
engages our bodies in shaping our imagination and our 
behavior. The rituals of handling and mastering the 
iPhone habituate us to treat the world as available to 
me to be selected, scaled, scanned, and enjoyed; what 
surrounds me exists for me (Imagining 143). Similarly, 
signing up for Twitter or Facebook leads to habits that 
shape one’s orientation to the world and, indeed, make 
one’s world. Because they shape our consciousness and 
world, secular liturgies are actually religious, imagin-
ing gods and visions of the good life. 
By contrast, according to Smith, “Christian wor-
ship is an intentionally decentering practice, calling us 
out of ourselves into the very life of God” (Imagining 
140). This decentering and re-formation through 
Christian worship culminates in sending the worship-
ers out to embody a foretaste of God’s shalom. Invited 
into union with the Triune God, we are formed for 
service. Smith points to John Calvin, who saw worship 
as a formative practice leading to the renewal not only 
of worshipers but also of the city beyond the church 
door. 
In Christian worship, not only the decentering 
and re-formational effects of worship but also the form 
of worship—the form of the story telling—matters, 
Smith asserts. He explains that, because the form of 
worship enacts the Story, we can’t distill the message of 
the gospel and then place it in a coffee shop container 
or just any form of meeting. Rather, as liturgical ani-
mals, we are formed by the practices of worship, either 
the iPhone or the Christian liturgy. Smith includes a 
comparative chart of historic liturgies demonstrating 
the common shape of the liturgy over the centuries, 
now found in five different 20th-century books of wor-
ship, and urges their use. Worship works as it is re-
peated, forming and shaping perception and habitus, 
habituating us to walk humbly and justly with our 
God in his world.
In a sense, Imagining the Kingdom is an exercise 
in liturgical catechesis. It is an extended reflection on 
practice, an intellectual analysis of how worship works. 
Far from dismissing the guidance of the mind and of 
theological principle, Smith seeks to direct our reflec-
tion towards our embodied, incarnate being-in-the-
world so that we can choose how to be habituated, 
how to escape the food court at Costco. 
Liturgical theologians commonly assert the for-
mative effects of liturgy in terms of the ideas and the 
truths presented in the Eucharist and baptism, but 
they seldom explain how this works, as Smith does. 
Some look mainly at religious rituals in general; they 
use the insights of Victor Taylor, Catharine Bell, and 
Roy Rappaport and make comparisons with Christian 
rituals, theorizing about the formative effects. Martha 
Moore Keish in her book Do This in Remembrance of 
Me3 draws on Rappaport to emphasize the bodily na-
ture of ritual: “The physical doing is critically impor-
tant in the celebration of the eucharist” (Do This 92). 
Louis Marie Chauvet (Symbol and Sacrament) cites 
Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu mostly in terms of lan-
guage theory, along with J. L. (John Langshaw, 1911–
1960) Austin’s theory of speech acts, to show how lan-
guage functions in the liturgy. Joyce Ann Zimmerman 
and Graham Hughes draw on Paul Ricour’s herme-
neutical approach to interpret liturgical texts. But sel-
dom do we find an in-depth use of Merleau-Ponty and 
Bourdieu’s phenomenology and sociology. Smith has 
done us a great service in linking Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Bourdieu’s studies with the Christian liturgical forma-
tion of character and behavior, focusing on how the 
body is trained to perceive, and how sustained group 
experience trains the body’s imagination and desires. 
Imagining is characterized by a rich interaction 
38     Pro Rege—September 2013
with other scholars from many disciplines, which leads 
to fruitful footnotes for the reader. The conversation is 
going on at two levels, and the bottom of the page is 
as much fun as the top. However, because of the many 
valuable sources in the footnotes, I was disappointed 
to find no bibliography at the end of the book. The 
indices are also skimpy, running only 2 ½ pages for 
names and 1 ½ for subjects. I found this especially 
frustrating for a book partly aimed at scholars. 
With that said, Imagining the Kingdom: How 
Worship Works is a ground-breaking effort. I will re-
fer to it again and again in pursuing my own research 
agenda, seeking to better understand how worship 
works.
Endnotes
1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, trans, Colin Smith (New York: Taylor 
and Francis e-Library, 2005).
2. In explaining habitus, Smith draws mostly on 
Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. 
Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1990).
3. Martha Moore Keish, Do This in Remembrance of 
Me (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008)
Wittenberg, David. Time Travel: The Popular Philosophy of Narrative. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2013. 306 pages. ISBN: 9780823249961. Reviewed by Josh Matthews, professor of English, Dordt College.
You might’ve seen this one before: it’s a familiar 
science fiction (SF) plot. Frustrated by his inability 
to defeat the Superhero, the Archvillain builds a time 
machine to travel to the past, intending to kill the 
Superhero as a child. Someone therefore needs to save 
this child; otherwise, the Archvillain will take over the 
world. Because of this threat to the past from the fu-
ture, the plot, as it were, thickens. 
“But wait,” you wonder. “If the Archvillain really 
did kill the child-Superhero, then why would he need 
to travel to the past? Wouldn’t the Superhero already 
be dead in the present? In fact, the Superhero never 
would have existed in the first place, meaning that the 
Archvillain wouldn’t ever need to travel to the past af-
ter he time-traveled! He built the time machine, but if 
he kills the Superhero, he never actually built it!”
Such time-travel paradoxes have long been fod-
der for SF stories, but few have considered them to 
be more than silly puzzles or fun little thought-exper-
iments for analytical philosophy. David Wittenberg’s 
book Time Travel: The Popular Philosophy of Narrative, 
however, challenges us to consider why so many SF 
narratives feature time-travel paradoxes like this as cru-
cial plot elements. For Wittenberg, Associate Professor 
of English at the University of Iowa, time-travel stories 
fundamentally challenge our understanding of narra-
tive. These stories ask, as he puts it, “many of the most 
basic questions about storytelling, […] about the phi-
losophy of temporality, history, and subjectivity” (2). 
In other words, time-travel fiction literally depicts key 
questions about the construction of history and the 
phenomenology of reading and interpreting. This is a 
serious kind of fiction in which readers and viewers 
become, perhaps unwittingly, “narrative theorists” (8).
Wittenberg spends much of the book arguing and 
demonstrating, via close readings of SF texts such as 
episodes of Star Trek and the first Back to the Future 
movie, that time-travel challenges our assumptions 
about narrative. As he points out, literary theorists 
have long distinguished between “story” and “plot,” 
or, in Wittenberg’ preferred terms (coined by Russian 
formalists), between “fabula” and “sjuzhet.” The fabula 
is the chronological order of a narrative’s events, while 
the sjuzhet is the order of events as presented by a nar-
rative. Thus, for Back to the Future (1985), the fabula 
begins in 1955 and ends in 1985: first, Marty McFly 
in 1955 tries desperately to get his parents to meet and 
fall in love, and then in 1985 McFly time-travels in a 
DeLorean into the past. But the sjuzhet of Back to the 
Future depicts McFly as beginning his story in 1985, 
travelling to 1955, and then back to 1985.1 Wittenberg 
demonstrates that narratologists and many writers, 
such as Henry James, have long preferred fabula to 
sjuzhet. In James’ view, for example, writers should 
be a kind of “historian,” thinking first of fabula and 
then constructing the sjuzhet (120). Moreover, when 
we think about the events in a story, we tend to re-tell 
them chronologically, even if the narrative does not 
present them chronologically. Wittenberg calls this 
common preference for fabula “fabular apriority.” 
Time-travel stories, as in this example of Back to 
the Future, challenge fabular apriority. They depict, 
literally, via time-travelers within their plots, a crisis 
of narrative priority. What if, as in a reader/viewer’s 
experience of narrative, the sjuzhet is really prior to the 
fabula? By trying to change his past, the Archvillain 
who intends to kill the child-Superhero challenges 
traditional narrative theory. His story posits that the 
